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This paper examines whether a small-open-economy, DSGE-based, New-Keynesian model can provide 
a natural framework for monetray policy conduct with the use of a hybrid monetary-policy regime. 
Allowing for some inflation inertia, a small-open-economy version of the Calvo sticky-price model to 
investigate hybrid inflation/price-level targeting was developed. This paper explores the proprieties of 
monetary policy in terms of Taylor interest-rate rules and conduct welfare analysis on various 
specifications. The study’s analyses show that hybrid targeting outperforms other specifications and 
produces quantitatively good results by lowering output and inflation variabilities when compared to 
regimes targeting the price levels or the inflation rate. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Over the past two decades, many developed economies 
have been radically transformed. These countries, after 
shifting to a new monetary policy regime, now show a low 
rate of inflation, and the private sector is more concerned 
about costs as well as being more productive and 
efficient than during the 1990's. As a result of the 
unsatisfactory monetary policy performance, countries 
such New Zealand, Canada, Australia, Sweden and U.K. 
introduced policies targeting inflation rate to achieve price 
stability. However, the definition of price stability and how 
to achieve it is still controversial and the meaning of price 
stability remains unclear. The debate has mainly focused 
on whether the inflation rate or the price-level path should 
be the policy target. More specifically, under inflation 
targeting (hereafter, IT), the central bank tries to bring the 
inflation rate to the target, while it aims to bring the price 
level to its initial level at the time the regime is 
established with price-level targeting (hereafter, PT). An 
alternative method considers a hybrid target (hereafter, 
HT) based on a weighted average of an inflation target 
and price-level target. This paper addresses this 
particular issue in a small open economy setting. 
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The difference between the three regimes can be 
captured in their effects on price level. The IT regime 
aims to maintain a stable path for future inflation even if 
this leads to a unit root (non stationarity) in the price 
level. The PT regime implies a stable path for price level 
leading at the same time to a stationary price level 
around the targeted value and a stationary inflation rate 
around zero. The hybrid regime combines the 
characteristics of IT and PT by incorporating an average 
of inflation and price level target. This policy (HT) targets 
an average inflation of several forthcoming periods rather 
than targeting one-period ahead (IT) or an infinite horizon 
(PT). The present work lays out a small-open-economy 
model with Calvo-type staggered price setting. Moreover, 
the benchmark model allows for some inflation inertia by 
including price indexation to past inflation. Introducing 
price indexation, results in a lagged inflation term in the 
price equation and therefore, a better fit for inflation 
persistence. The resulting specification enables the study 
to focus on the monetary-policy implications of different 
regimes namely inflation, price-level and hybrid targeting. 
Also, the welfare implications of these policy regimes 
were addressed. The small-open-economy representation 
takes into consideration the possibility that international 
trade and financial assets will affect the evolution of the 
domestic economy. From a theoretical point of view, the 
‘small open economy' assumption is particularly attract-
tive, as many of the results that are obscured in a closed 
economy are more readily apparent here. Additionally, 
there   are   additional   shocks   (the   exchange   rate for 
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example) that are not relevant to a closed economy. 
Thus, foreign shocks, such as changes in terms of trade, 
can alter domestic business-cycle fluctuations, giving rise 
to further dynamics within the model, which may lead the 
monetary authority to explicitly take these kinds of 
fluctuations into account (Lubik and Schorfheide, 2003).1 
The study’s results suggest that allowing for some base 
drift in the price level (HT), small-open-economy welfare 
is improved. Indeed, these findings are consistent with 
the fact that hybrid inflation/price-level targeting performs 
well and provides an alternative method for conducting 
successful monetary policy in the case of a small-open 
economy without the shortcomings of the other monetary-
policy regimes considered in this work (IT and PT). 
Following a hybrid targeting rule, a central bank 
generates lower variabilities in domestic inflation and 
output gap and reports significant benefits when adopting 
a HT regime.  
 
 
Inflation rate versus price-level target: The debate 
 
Throughout the last decade, inflation targeting was widely 
adopted as a framework for monetary policy. Several 
industrialized countries formally or informally adopted IT 
targeting and thus, far most enjoy low inflation,2 price 
stability and satisfactory real-growth records (before the 
current crisis).3 In contrast, 'conventional wisdom', as 
Svensson (1999) called it, has been sceptical of price-
level targeting. The main argument against PT is that it 
induces both higher short-run inflation and output 
variability compared to IT (Fischer, 1994; Haldane and 
Salmon, 1995). However, Dittmar et al. (1999) and 
Svensson (1999) argued that PT has advantages over IT, 
since, with PT inflation, variability becomes lower, 
assuming output variability is at least moderately 
persistent.4 The controversy mainly concerns the 
definition of price stability and more particularly how price 
stability can be maintained in practice. For instance, 
monetary authorities should choose paths for either price 
level or the inflation rate allowing, in the latter case, for a 
base drift in the price level.5 
 
                                            
1Domestic policy decisions do not indeed have any impacts on the rest of the 
world, allowing us to abstract from strategic interactions between the domestic 
economy and the rest of the world. 
2A survey of literature on the economic performance of inflation-targeting 
countries is presented in Svensson (1995) Haldane (1995) and Bernanke et al. 
(1999). 
3Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom (UK) and 
other industrialized countries have adopted an IT regime. The current economic 
crisis cast, however, doubt about those performances and an old debate on the 
role that asset prices should play in the monetary policy strategy of price 
stability oriented monetary authorities is revived.  
4Svensson (1999) and Vestin (2000) argue that price-level targeting yields 
better output-inflation variability trade-off and price stability than does 
inflation targeting. 
5The first known example of an implicit target for price stability was in terms 
of price-level targeting, as adopted by Sweden in the 1930s (see Berg and 
Jonung, 1999). 
 
 
 
 
More recently, Nessen (2002) and Nessen and Vestin 
(2000) suggest that the central bank should target 
average inflation over several periods. Batini and Yates 
(2003), Cecchetti and Kim (2003) and Kobayashi (2004) 
investigated another novel proposal that combines IT and 
PT in a mixed regime, called hybrid inflation/price-level 
targeting. In this proposal, inflation volatility becomes 
lower when compared to PT and IT regimes. Indeed, 
Batini and Yates (2003) introduce a new perspective on 
the analysis of price-level and inflation targets by 
considering a hybrid target, which is a weighted average 
of an inflation and a price-level target. They do not, 
however, use a utility-based, welfare-loss function as an 
evaluation criterion. In their analysis of price-level versus 
inflation targeting under different model specifications, 
policy rules and loss functions of the central bank, Batini 
and Yates (2003) found that the more forward-looking the 
model, the less noticeable the difference between the 
reaction functions of inflation and price-level targeting; 
thus, making the performance of such rules highly 
dependent on the degree of forward-looking behaviour. 
Using Fuhrer and Moore’s (1995) model to explore the 
implications of these regimes for the United Kingdom, 
Batini and Yates (2003) examined both a set of simple 
rules feeding back from alternative combinations of price-
level and inflation deviations from a given target and a set 
of optimal control rules obtained under the assumption 
that policy makers minimize a loss function which 
penalizes a mixed price-level/inflation target.6 Despite the 
contribution of these theoretical works, however, few 
studies have directly evaluated the HT regime using 
open-economy models. An analysis of HT in a small-
open-economy environment is relevant, especially given 
the IT- and PT-regimes' shortcomings, as well as the 
implications of these weaknesses for central banks. 
This work departs from the above-mentioned literature 
in at least two dimensions, extending the works of Batini 
and Yates (2003) and Kobayashi (2004). First, the study 
considered a New-Keynesian environment combined with 
inflation inertia where the model's dynamics are enriched 
by allowing for price indexation rather than considering 
them only in a pure Calvo-staggered fashion. Secondly, a 
utility-based and welfare-loss function as an evaluation 
criterion to evaluate the hybrid monetary-policy regime 
was used. By combining these new features, new insights 
on the price-level versus inflation targeting debate were 
obtained. The potential implications of these insights 
were discussed later in this paper. In line with previous 
research on monetary-policy analysis, the study adopts 
the New-Keynesian framework, a model that many 
macroeconomic     studies     have     indeed     frequently  
                                            
6Batini and Yates (2003) explored the implications of the HT regime using a 
reduced form of the Fuhrer and Moore (1995) model which is not built on 
microfoundations that are as compelling as the Calvo model. Like the original 
Taylor model, the Fuhrer-Moore model is based on some arbitrary but 
superficially plausible assumptions about the form of labour contracts 
(Mankiw, 2001). 
  
 
 
employed.7 The most important feature of this model is 
the appearance of terms that reflect the forward-looking 
behaviour of representative agents. This leads, for 
example, to a stabilization-bias problem that occurs if 
monetary authorities apply discretionary monetary policy 
(Clarida et al., 2000). Most of the literature to date uses 
the new classical model to assess the properties of the 
HT regime and confirms its advantages (Kobayashi, 
2004). However, the use of New-Keynesian models in 
analyzing the HT regime is only in its early stages.8 In this 
paper, an attempt was made to investigate this 
framework and provide evidence that will assist in 
discriminating between hybrid regimes and other kinds of 
monetary-policy targeting. 
The recent development in new-open-economy 
macroeconomics, originating with Obstfeld and Rogof 
(1995), has led to a wealth of literature in which micro-
founded and optimization-based models are used for 
policy analysis in the open economy.9 These studies 
highlight the role of the terms of trade in the transmission 
of business cycles (Corsetti and Pesenti, 2001). As in 
Gali and Monacelli (2005)10, a small-open-economy 
version of the Calvo sticky-price model is considered to 
show how the equilibrium dynamics can be reduced to a 
simple representation in domestic inflation and output 
gap. The model used here further explores this avenue 
and extends Galii and Monacelli's (2005) framework to 
account for HT targeting. The resulting setting was used 
to analyze the macroeconomic implications of three 
alternative rule-based policy regimes for the small-open 
economy: a CPI-inflation-based Taylor rule, pure price-
level targeting and a hybrid- inflation/price-level-based 
rule. 
In the study’s empirical work, the New Keynesian 
framework was used in a calibrated DSGE model, 
applying the hybrid monetary-policy rule. The study 
calibrated key parameters to match some broad 
characteristics of the Canadian data. Since analytical 
solutions are often not available for this regime and 
empirical literature has not reached a consensus about 
key parameters, the study must then rely on a calibrated 
model. Subsequently, a welfare analysis of the various 
monetary-policy regimes considered in this study was 
conducted and their impulse-response functions were 
compared. The paper proceeds in the following manner: 
Part 2 sketches the model's derivation as suggested by 
the microfoundations  presented  by  Galí  and  Monacelli  
                                            
7See for example McCallum and Nelson (2000), Clarida et al. (2000), Ball 
(1999) and Svensson (2000) for a discussion of these kinds of models. 
8Dittmar et al. (1999) Cecchetti and Kim (2003) and Kobayashi (2004) 
analyzed the hybrid regime using a model similar to Svensson's (1999) model. 
Batini and Yates (2003) explored the implications of this regime using the 
Fuhrer and Moore (1995) model. 
9See Lane (2001) for a survey. 
10The authors develop a tractable optimizing model of a small open economy 
with staggered price setting à la Calvo to analyze three interest rate rules: the 
domestic-inflation-based Taylor rule, the CPI-based Taylor rule, and an 
exchange rate peg. 
 
 
 
(2005). Part 3 provides details on the quantitative 
methodology and discusses the results. Part 4 introduces 
welfare analysis and provides some results. Part 5 
presents the concluding remarks. 
 
 
THE MODEL 
 
The study constructs a model that is a variant of a dynamic New-
Keynesian model applied to a small-open economy, following 
Clarida et al. (2002) and Galíi and Monacelli (2005). In order to 
make this paper self-contained, key structural equations are 
presented in this part. The model has three sectors: (1) a 
continuum of profit-maximizing and monopolistically-competitive 
firms (owned by consumers who include their shares in their 
portfolios) operating a constant return-to-scale technology and 
making staggered price decisions in the spirit of Calvo (1983), (2) 
an infinitely-lived representative household which maximizes a 
utility function defined over a composite consumption-good and 
labour supply and (3) a central bank which sets the monetary policy 
through an interest rule that targets both the price level and the 
inflation rate in a hybrid formula. 
 
 
Firms' problem 
 
Production technology 
 
There is a continuum of identical monopolistically-competitive firms. 
The production function for firm i that produces a differentiated 
good iY  is 
 
),(=)( iNAiY ttt                                              (1) 
 
Where 0,1]∈i , )(iYt  and )(iNt  are the firm’s i 's specific 
output and labour input, respectively. )(log= tt Aa  is a total-factor 
productivity index driven by an (1)AR  exogenous stochastic 
process, ,ˆ=ˆ
,1 tatat aa ερ +− where ta ,ε  is a white noise with 
mean 0 and variance 2εσ . The cost minimization problem leads to 
the expression of real marginal cost in terms of home prices as 
.
)(1
=
,tHt
t
t PA
WMC τ−  Hence, the log of real marginal cost, which is 
common across domestic firms, is given by  
 
,ˆˆˆ=
, ttHtt apwmc −−−
∧
ν                                  (2) 
 
Where tHp ,ˆ
 
 and twˆ  stand respectively for the deviations of 
domestic price and wage rate from their steady-state values. 
),(1log= τν −−  where τ  is an employment subsidy created to 
exactly compensate for the monopolistic competition distortion. The 
employment subsidy exactly offsets the combined effects of the 
firm's market power and the terms-of-trade distortions in the steady-
state. In this case, there is only one effective distortion left in the 
small-open-economy model, namely sticky prices. 
Let tY  define the aggregate index for domestic output and tN , the 
aggregate employment. tY  and tN  can be expressed in  terms  of 
  
 
an individual firm's output as follows  
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Where 1>ξ  is the elasticity of substitution among goods within 
each category. Moreover, defining di
Y
iYZ
t
t
t
)(
=
1
0∫
 yields 
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t
tt
t A
ZYN In loglinear form (up to a first order approximation), 
aggregate output reduces to 
 
,ˆˆ=ˆ ttt nay +                                                          (3) 
 
where the variables tt ay ˆ,ˆ  and tnˆ  represent the deviations of 
output, total-factor productivity and employment from a symmetric 
steady-state. 
 
 
Price setting 
 
Price-setting behaviour follows Calvo (1983) and Yun (1996) in that 
only a fraction )(1 ψ−  of firms adjust their prices each period. 
Indeed, firms are not allowed to change their prices unless they 
receive a signal allowing them to re-optimize prices. Following 
Christiano et al. (2005), prices set by firms that do not receive a 
random price-change signal are indexed to past inflation.11 
Furthermore, Christiano et al. (2005) assume that prices are fully 
indexed to past inflation, but empirical models that allow for partial 
indexation (following Smets and Wouters, 2003) often find that the 
best-fitting value for the degree (of?) price indexation is positive but 
less than one. The partial indexation allows the study to have some 
inflation inertia, leeway, which can make the model  more robust for 
policy and welfare analysis, especially if it is interested in welfare 
evaluation of inflation costs. Erceg et al. (2000) used indexation to 
the steady-state inflation rate, allowing them to compute a 
linearized equation for inflation combining with the expected future 
and lagged inflation. This equation differs from the forward-looking 
inflation process obtained under the standard Calvo model. Let 
n
tHP ,  be the price set by firm i  adjusting its price in period t  and 
facing a probability kψ  of keeping its price unchanged for k  
periods (for 0,=k  1,  2,... ). b tHP ,  defines the price chosen by 
the remaining fraction ψ  of firms not optimally adjusting their 
prices at time t . The (log) price b tHp ,ˆ  is set according to the simple 
and backward-looking rule 1,1,, ˆˆ=ˆ −− Π+ tHptH
b
tH pp γ , while the 
new price must satisfy the following equation; 
 
},{)()(1=
,
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k
k
n
tH PmcEP ++
∞
+−+ ∑ βψβψµ          (4) 
                                            
11Price indexation makes the price dispersion between individual prices of the 
monopolistic firms much smaller compared with constant price-setting 
behaviour, a feature that bears important consequences for monetary-policy 
evaluation. See Rabanal and Rubio-Ramrez, 2005, for a general discussion 
about price indexation. 
 
 
 
 
Where pγ  is the coefficient of price indexation and µ  is the 
steady-state markup.12 The dynamics of the domestic price index 
are then given by 
 
ξξξ ψψ −−−
−
−+ 1
1
1
,
1
1,, )]))((1)([= n tHb tHtH PPP                      (5) 
 
which can be loglinearized to obtain an expression for the domestic 
inflation as follows: 
 
).ˆˆ)((1ˆ=ˆ 1,,1,, −− −−+ tHn tHtHptH ppψpiψγpi          (6) 
 
Combining (6) with the differentiated version of (5) yields the 
aggregate supply equation 
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where )(1)/)(1(1= pβψγψψβψκ +−− . tmc
⊇
 represents the 
log-deviation of the real marginal cost. Equation (7) shows that the 
domestic inflation dynamic has both forward-looking and backward-
looking components. The real marginal costs faced by the firms are 
also an important determinant of domestic inflation. Note that with 
0=pγ , this equation reverts to the standard open-economy 
supply equation. 
Moreover, assuming that the degree of price stickiness ψ  is 
identical across economies, the firms in the rest of the world (ROW) 
face simple Calvo-style price-setting behaviour. For simplicity and 
without loss of generality, it is assumed, throughout the study’s 
analysis, that the degree of price indexation in the ROW ∗pγ  is 
equal to zero.13 
 
 
Households 
 
The small-open economy is inhabited by a continuum of infinitely-
lived households where the representative household seeks to 
maximize the expected utility 
                          ),,(
0=
tt
t
t
t NCUE β∑
∞
                    (8) 
 
Where tN  is hours worked and tC  is a composite consumption 
index defined by 
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The   elasticity  of  substitution  between  the  indices  of  home  and  
  
                                            
12The forward-looking pricing decision is related to the fact that firms that 
adjust their price in any period do so for a random number of periods. The price 
is then set as a markup over the average of expected future marginal costs. 
13Setting 
∗
pγ  so that it is equal to the domestic price-indexation coefficient (or 
0≠∗pγ ) does not significantly change the policy-evaluation results. 
  
 
 
foreign goods is given by 0>θ . tHC ,  is the consumption index 
of j  domestic goods defined by the CES aggregator 
1
1
,
1
0,
]))(([= −
−
∫
ξ
ξ
ξ
ξ
djjCC tHtH . Likewise, the consumption 
index tFC ,  is the index of j  imported goods given by 
1
1
,
1
0,
]))(([= −
−
∫
ξ
ξ
ξ
ξ
djjCC tFtF , where the elasticity of 
substitution among goods within the two indices ξ  is greater than 
.one
 
Maximization of expected utility is subject to a sequence of budget 
constraints of the form  
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1
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1
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Where )(
,
jP tH  is the price of domestic good j  and )(, jP tF  is 
the price of imported good j  expressed in home currency. 1+tD  is 
the nominal payoff in period 1+t  of the portfolio held at the end of 
period t  (including firm shares), tW  is the nominal wage rate and 
tT  is lump-sum transfers/taxes. 1, +ttO  is the stochastic discount 
factor for one-period-ahead nominal payoffs relevant to the 
domestic household. 
Given the constant elasticity of the substitution aggregator for 
tHC ,  and tFC , , the optimal allocation for good j is provided by the 
following demand functions:  
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Note that the above functions define the quantities consumed for 
each type of good, where tHP ,  and tFP ,  are the domestic and 
foreign price indices expressed in domestic currency. tHP ,  and 
tFP ,  are then given by the following expressions: 
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Combining (11) and (12), the study obtained 
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Similarly, it can be shown that the optimal allocations between 
domestic and imported goods are provided by relations  
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consumer price index (CPI), or in loglinearized form, 
)(1=ˆ α−tp  α+tHp ,ˆ  .ˆ ,tFp  Accordingly, total consumption 
expenditures for the domestic household are given by 
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,,,, tttFtFtHtH CPCPCP +                                  (13) 
 
Substituting this relationship back into (10), the intertemporal 
budget constraint can be rewritten as  
 
.}{ 11, tttttttttt TNWDDOECP +++ ++                      (14) 
 
To solve the household's optimization problem, the following 
functional form for the utility function was introduced14 
.
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=),(
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NCNCU  This yields the following set of first 
order conditions. First, the intratemporal optimality condition 
t
t
tt P
WNC =φσ  states that at any period of time t, the marginal utility of 
consumption is equal to the marginal value of labour. On the other 
hand, intertemporal optimization (for all states and dates) implies 
the following Euler equation with regards to consumption: 
 
).()(=
1
1
1,
+
−+
+
t
t
t
t
ttt P
P
C
COE σβ                                (15) 
 
Let 1,1/= +tttt OER  defines the gross return on a riskless one-
period discount bond paying off one unit of domestic currency in 
1.+t  Equation (15) can easily be rewritten as a standard Euler 
equation; 
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which, in loglinearized form, yields, 
)ˆ(1ˆ=ˆ 11 ρpiσ −−− ++ tttttt ErcEc  where βρ log−≡  is the 
time discount factor. 
It is assumed that households in the rest of the world face the 
same optimization problem as the one outlined above where 
influence from the domestic economy is negligible; that is, relative 
to the ROW economy, the size of the small-open economy is 
negligible.15 
 
 
Inflation, terms of trade and the real exchange rate 
 
This section sets out the relationships between inflation, terms of 
trade and the exchange rate. It is assumed that the law of one price 
holds for all goods (including imported goods), at all times implying 
that;  
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14Then the Lagrangian expression for this problem is given by  
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15This assumption allows us to treat the ROW economy as a closed economy. 
  
 
Where tε  is the bilateral nominal exchange rate
16
 and )(
,
jPFtF  is 
the price of good )( j  produced in a foreign country, as expressed 
in terms of the foreign currency. Substituting (12) back into (17) 
yields the following expression for the foreign price index  
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ξξε −−∫ djjPP FtFttF  Similarly, if the foreign price 
index is defined as ξξ −−∗ ∫
1
1
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,
1
0
]))(([= djjPP FtFt , the relation 
between the home price of imported goods and the foreign price 
index in loglinearized form around a steady-state can be written as 
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In addition, using the terms-of-trade definition ,/=
,tHttt PPS
∗ε
 
and loglinearizing around a symmetric steady-state yields  
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Thus, terms of trade may be defined as the price of foreign goods 
per unit of home good. Since, by definition, the real exchange rate 
(in loglinearized form) is given by ,ˆˆˆ=ˆ tttt ppeq −+
∗
 substituting 
into equation (19) yields the following relation between the real 
exchange rate and the terms of trade given by the price levels:  
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On the other hand, using the definition of the price indices, it can be 
shown that 
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Furthermore, assuming that purchasing power parity (PPP)17 holds 
in the steady-state, that is, 1,==
H
F
P
PS  and combining this 
equation with (19) and (21), the relation between the domestic price 
level and the CPI can be written as follows: 
 
.ˆ=ˆˆ
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As a result, the study arrived at an identity-linking CPI inflation (
tpi ), 
domestic inflation (
tH ,pi ) and the change in the terms of trade : 
 
.ˆˆ=ˆ
, ttHt s∆+αpipi                                           (23) 
 
The difference between the CPI and domestic inflation is 
proportional to the change in the terms of trade  and  the  coefficient  
 
                                            
16The price of foreign-country currency in terms of domestic currency. An 
increase in 
tε  coincides with an appreciation of domestic currency. 
17
 Assuming a symmetric steady state satisfying the purchasing power parity 
condition is quite common in this kind of models. 
 
 
 
 
of proportionality increases with the degree of openness, α . 
Furthermore, substituting (22) back into (20) yields an expression 
for the real exchange rate as a function of terms of trade, that is, 
 
,ˆ)(1=ˆ tt sq α−                                                         (24) 
 
which establishes a relation between real exchange rate and terms 
of trade, depending on the degree of openness of the SOE. 
 
 
International risk sharing 
 
In the study’s model, it is assumed that a complete security market 
actually exists in the world, where the expected nominal return from 
risk-free bonds, in domestic currency terms, must be the same as 
the expected domestic-currency return from foreign bonds, that is, 
.=
1
1,1,
+
∗
++
t
t
tttttt OEOE ε
ε
 The Euler equation also holds for the 
foreign representative household and must equate the 
intertemporal optimality condition for the domestic household.18 This 
yields a relationship between the domestic and foreign level of 
consumption in terms of (log) real exchange rate ( tQ ), that is, 
 
.=
1
1
1
1
1
σσ
tt
t
t
tt QCC
CQC ∗
∗
+
+
−
+
                                            (25) 
 
Finally, replacing 1+tC  and ∗+1tC  with their respective expression 
yields the following optimal allocation for the imported good: 
 
.= ttt CQC θα −∗                                                        (26) 
 
Therefore, the relation in (25) can be rewritten as ,=
1
σ
ttot QCC ∗Φ  
where oΦ  depends on the initial condition of the country's asset 
position. If symmetric initial conditions between home and foreign 
country are assumed with zero foreign asset holdings for the small- 
open economy, without loss of generality, the study will obtain 
1=oΦ  so that the loglinearized form leads to 
 
.ˆ
1
ˆ=ˆ ttt qcc σ
+∗                                                          (27) 
 
Substituting (24) back into (27) then yields 
 
.ˆ
1
ˆ=ˆ ttt scc σ
α−
+∗                                              (28) 
 
which links both consumption variables to the terms of trade. 
 
 
Uncovered interest parity 
 
The assumption of complete  securities  markets  points  to  another 
                                            
18Using the fact that )},)((){(=
11
1
1,
+
∗
+
∗
−
∗
∗
+
+
t
t
t
t
t
t
tttt P
P
C
CEOE
ε
εβ σ  combining this 
equation with its domestic counterpart, substituting in tttt PPQ /= ∗ε  and 
rearranging terms to get the next equation. 
  
 
 
important relationship and the uncovered interest parity (UIP) 
condition. Using the previous Euler equation, which also holds for 
foreign households, that is, 1,=)}(){(
1
1
∗
+
∗
−
∗
∗
+∗
t
t
t
t
tt P
P
C
CER σβ  or put in 
another way, 
)}(){(=
1
11
∗
+
∗
−
∗
∗
+−∗
t
t
t
t
tt P
P
C
CER σβ                                 (29) 
 
and substituting (29) back into the Euler equation yields the price of 
a riskless bond dominated in foreign currency as 
 
}.{= 11,1 ++−∗ tttttt OER εε                                            (30) 
 
Since, by definition, ,= 1,1 +− tttt OER  (30) implies that 
0=)]}/([{ 11, ttttttt RROE εε +∗+ − , loglinearizing around the perfect-
foresight steady-state yields the asset pricing equation for nominal 
bonds, which implies that the interest rate differential is related to 
the expected exchange rate depreciation 
 
},ˆ{=ˆˆ 1+∗ ∆− tttt eErr                                             (31) 
 
where teˆ  is the deviation of the nominal exchange rate from its 
steady-state value. Thus, the UIP condition for the nominal 
exchange rate holds in equilibrium, meaning that the risk premium 
is assumed to be constant in the steady-state. 
 
 
Monetary policy 
 
To close the model, it is assumed that the central bank sets the 
nominal interest rate following a Taylor-type interest-rate rule. 
However, money does not appear in either the household utility 
function or in the budget constraint. Indeed, recent research on 
monetary policy adopts this modeling strategy (Galí and Monacelli, 
2005). In this kind of model, money plays the role of a unit of 
account only. Moreover, the influential work by Taylor (1993) uses 
an interest rate feedback from output and inflation to approximate 
monetary policy. Recently, Woodford (2000) demonstrated that the 
interest rate rule is consistent with nominal demand determinacy for 
forward-looking models even when money demand is not present in 
the model. In addition, in an open-economy model, the exchange 
rate is affected by the difference between domestic and foreign 
nominal interest rates and the expected future exchange rates, via 
an interest rate parity condition (Svensson, 1998). The real 
exchange rate will then affect the relative price of domestic and 
foreign goods, which in turn affects both domestic and foreign 
demand for domestic goods and hence contributes to movements 
in CPI inflation. Likewise, the exchange rate affects the domestic 
currency prices of imported final goods included in the CPI price. In 
this way, monetary policy can affect both the CPI price and the CPI 
inflation rate. Consequently, when analyzing the study’s model 
under HT targeting, a monetary rule that incorporates both the price 
level and the inflation rate is considered, whereas the historical rule 
is only an inflation-based rule. 
In the present paper, an analysis was done on the 
macroeconomic implications of three alternative monetary-policy 
regimes for the small-open economy: a policy that aims at fully 
stabilizing CPI inflation (IT), a policy that stabilizes CPI price level 
(PT) and a policy that combines price-level and inflation targeting 
(HT). As in Galí and Monacelli (2005), it is assumed that the world 
monetary authority succeeds in fully stabilizing world prices and the 
output gap; hence, 0==ˆ ∗∗ tty pi  is assumed for all t  which is optimal  
 
 
 
for the closed economy under the study’s assumptions. 
 
 
Inflation targeting 
 
Inflation targeting is the policy which responds to deviations of the 
CPI inflation rate from the target. This regime acts in stabilizing the 
CPI inflation rate around the inflation-target path. Moreover, IT 
involves price-level drift and consequently price non stationarity. A 
Taylor rule representation was adopted (Taylor 1993) where the 
interest rate ( trˆ ) reacts to inflation deviations from its target )ˆ( tpi  
and output deviations from potential (output gap, tx ), that is 
,ˆ=ˆ tytt xr φpiφρ pi ++  where ,ρ  piφ  and yφ  are policy 
parameters. The study analyzed the properties of the equilibrium of 
the small open-economy when this policy rule is used and its 
performance with PT and HT was compared. 
 
 
Price-level targeting 
 
Price-level targeting itself is a policy that systematically responds to 
deviations of the CPI price index from a predetermined long-run 
path. PT is then a policy stabilizing the price level ( tpˆ ) around the 
target path, which implies stationarity for the price index and an 
inflation rate around zero inflation. In the study’s analysis, PT with a 
fixed price-level target was considered (steady-state price level, 
P ), that is, PPt =  or in log deviation 0=ˆ tp . Thus, PT 
yields price-level stability around the steady-state price and zero 
inflation. 
 
 
Hybrid targeting 
 
A hybrid inflation/price-level targeting policy combines elements of 
both previous regimes. This regime embeds both an inflation and 
price-level target, allowing therefore for some base drift in the price 
path. As in Batini and Yates (2003), it is assumed that the monetary 
policy follows the generalized hybrid inflation/price-level target 
 
,)ˆˆ(}ˆ{=ˆ 11 tytttpttt xppEEr φχφpi +−+ −+         
                                                                              (32) 
 
Where trˆ  denotes the short-term nominal interest rate. ,ˆtpi  tpˆ  
are defined in the same way as stated above and tx  is the output 
gap. 0,1]∈χ  is the key parameter that defines the spectrum of 
targets between price-level and inflation targeting. When 0=χ , 
the policy makers target the price level only and when 1,=χ  only 
the level of inflation rate is targeted. For 1<<0 χ , the target is 
a hybrid regime targeting both the price-level and the inflation-rate 
level.19 The degree of price-level drift, χ , in Batini and Yates' 
[2003] model is treated as a choice variable for the government and 
no optimal value for this parameter is derived by the authors.  
                                            
19We only consider this last scheme in our analysis, that is, 1<<0 χ . 
We also study the welfare implications of varying χ  in the unit interval. 
  
 
However, Røisland (2006) shows that, within a model with inflation 
inertia due to price indexation, an HT regime can be adopted to 
achieve optimal policy identical to the one under commitment if the 
monetary authority sets the degree of price-level drift equal to the 
degree of price indexation. Hence, the optimal degree of price-level 
drift in the HT rule is equal to the degree of price indexation. 
 
 
Equilibrium determination 
 
Aggregate demand 
 
World output and consumption  
 
Combining the market clearing condition for the ROW economy, 
∗∗
tt cy ˆ=ˆ , with the Euler equation for the foreign household's 
consumption, ),ˆ(1ˆ=ˆ 11 ρpiσ −−−
∗
+
∗∗
+
∗
tttttt ErcEc  leads to a 
version of the new IS equation in the case of sticky-price models: 
 
).ˆ(1ˆ=ˆ 11 ρpiσ −−−
∗
+
∗∗
+
∗
tttttt EryEy                    (33) 
 
This IS equation shows that the foreign output is related negatively 
to the world interest rate and positively to the expected foreign CPI 
inflation. 
 
 
Small-open-economy output, consumption and trade balance  
 
Market clearing for domestic goods requires that 
),()(=)(
,,
iCiCiY tHtHt
∗+
 where )(iYt , )(, iC tH  and 
)(
,
iC tH
∗
 are respectively, the production, home and foreign 
demand for home produced good i . Moreover, based on 
preference symmetry between the home and the foreign country, it 
can be shown that  
 
.)()())((= ,
,
,
,
,
,
∗−
∗
−−∗
t
t
F
tF
F
tFt
tH
tH
tH
tH CP
P
P
P
P
iP
C θξξ
ε
α                    (34) 
 
Substituting (34) back into the market clearing condition above, the 
study gets 
 
})()())({(1))((=)( ,
,
,,
,
, ∗−
∗
−−− +− t
t
F
tF
F
tFt
tH
t
t
tH
tH
tH
t CP
P
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P
P
iP
iY θξθξ
ε
αα  
 
for all 0,1]∈i  and t. 
 
Using the fact that tH
F
tFtt PPS ,, /ε≡ , the aggregate output can be 
shown to reduce to 
 
].)[(1)(=
1
, σ
θθξθ αα
−
−
− +− ttt
t
tH
t QSCP
P
Y                    (35) 
 
Log-linearizing (35) while making use of ttHt spp ˆ=ˆˆ , α−  yields 
 
 
 
 
.ˆ)1(ˆˆ=ˆ tttt qscy σθααξ −++                                (36) 
 
Equation (36) states that the relation between output and 
consumption in terms of the exchange rate and terms-of-trade 
variables is governed by the degree of openness of the economy. 
Furthermore, notice that by using tt sq ˆ)(1=ˆ α− , expression 
(36) can be rewritten as  
 
,ˆˆ=ˆ ttt scy σ
αω
+                                            (37) 
 
Where ).1)(1(= ασθξσω −−+  Using the fact that 
,ˆ)1(ˆ=ˆ ttt syc σ
α−
+∗  equation (37) becomes  
 
ttt syy ˆ
1
=ˆ
ασ
+∗                                            (38) 
 
Where ])/[(1= αωασσα +−  and the subscript in ασ  is 
meant to emphasize the dependence of this parameter on the 
degree of openness of the economy (α ). Finally, a version of the 
new IS equation for the SOE can be computed by combining Euler 
equation (16) with (23) and (37), which yields  
 
}.ˆ{)}ˆ{ˆ(1}ˆ{=ˆ 11,1 +++ −−−− tttHttttt sEEryEy σ
αωρpi
σ
 
 
This leads to a different equation for output related to the domestic 
interest rate, world output and domestic inflation: 
 
}.ˆ{1)()}ˆ{ˆ(1}ˆ{=ˆ 11,1 ∗+++ ∆−+−−− tttHttttt yEEryEy ωαρpiσα
  
                                                                                 (39) 
 
This SOE equation is different from its closed-economy version 
because it depends on the small economy's degree of openness 
and on foreign output.20 
Moreover, net exports ( nx ) are related to domestic output in terms 
of steady-state output (Y) through the following equation 
 
).)(1(=
,
t
tH
t
tt CP
PY
Y
nx −                                  (40) 
 
Combining the linearized version of (40) with (22), (28) and (37) 
yields )ˆˆ)((1= ∗
∧
−Λ− ttt yynx  
Where .]/)[(1= σασασα +−Λ  The relationship between net 
exports and output differential is ambiguous and depends on the 
value of Λ . If 1<<1 Λ− , a positive output differential 
generates a trade surplus favourable to the small-open economy 
and with 1>Λ  or 1< −Λ , the trade surplus is favourable to the 
foreign country. Following Galí and Monacelli (2005), 1− 1≤Λ≤  
 
                                            
20It's easy to see that with 0=α , we can obtain the closed-economy version. 
  
 
is needed to satisfy the Marshall-Lerner conditions.21 
 
 
Deriving the new Keynesian Phillips curve (NKPC) 
 
Price stickiness is the only source of suboptimality in the equilibrium 
allocation. Indeed, as shown by Galí and Monacelli (2005), the 
employment subsidy neutralizes the market power distortion. By not 
assigning any explicit value to monetary holding balances, the 
monetary distortion that would pull monetary policy towards the 
Friedman rule is eliminated. Inflation inertia is also introduced in the 
model by the price behaviour. The resulting model is then 
consistent with what has been termed the NKPC. The 
determination of the real marginal cost as a function of domestic 
and foreign output is complex due to the wedge between some 
aggregate variables, namely output versus consumption and 
domestic price versus consumer price indexes. The study indeed 
has  
 
ttHtt apwmc ˆˆˆ= , −−+−
∧
ν
                               (41) 
 
,ˆ)(1ˆˆˆ= tttt asyy φσφν +−+++− ∗  
 
Where the last equality makes use of (3) and (28). According to 
(41), real marginal cost is increasing as it concerns the terms of 
trade, domestic and world output and is decreasing with regards to 
technology. Hence, the wealth and employment effects on real 
wages combined with the changes in the product wage and then 
the impacts on real wages lead to changes in marginal cost through 
its direct effect on labour productivity. It follows from equation (38) 
that in this case, real marginal cost is given by 
.ˆ)(1ˆ)(ˆ)(= tttt ayymc φσσφσν αα +−−+++− ∗
∧
       (42) 
 
In what follows, focus is on equation (7) in deriving a NKPC    
representation  for  the  small-open  economy  in  
 
 
 
 
terms of the output gap and domestic inflation given the study’s 
price schemes. Let the output gap22 tx  be defined as the deviation 
of domestic output tyˆ  from its 'natural' level ty . Formally, 
,ˆ= ttt yyx −  where natural output is computed by imposing the 
restriction µ−
∧
=tmc  for all t  in equation (42) and solving for 
domestic output, that is, 
,ˆ)(1ˆ)()(= ttt ayy φσσφσνµ αα +−−+++−− ∗  which, 
after some algebraic manipulations, yields the  natural  output  level 
as 
 
,ˆˆ= ttt ayy Ψ+Γ+Ω
∗
                                           (43) 
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21The Marshall-Lerner conditions apply if and only if the sum of the import and 
export elasticities is greater than one. 
22In our model, we have to handle three definitions of output: a measure of 
output, natural output (which we get in an economy with no imperfection 
or nominal rigidity) and finally the output gap, which is the difference 
between the output and the natural output. 
 
 
 
where Ω  =( ),)/( φσµν α +−  ))/((= φσσσ αα +−Γ  and 
))/((1= φσφ α ++Ψ . Equation (43) states that the natural 
output for the small-open economy is determined by world output 
and productivity, as well as domestic markup. In addition, a 
relationship between real marginal cost and the output gap can be 
derived according to  
 
tttttt ayayxmc ˆ)(1ˆ)()ˆ)(()(= φσσφσφσν ααα +−−+Ψ+Γ+Ω++++− ∗∗
∧
 
 
Where natural output has been substituted for its value in (43). By 
rearranging terms, the study gets 
 
,)(= tt xmc φσα +
∧
                                            (44) 
 
which can be combined with equation (7) to derive a NKPC in terms 
of the output gap 
  
,ˆ
1
}ˆ{
1
=ˆ 1,1,, ttH
p
p
tHt
p
tH xE δpiβψγ
γ
piβψγ
β
pi +
+
+
+ −+
        (45) 
 
Where =δ  ).( φσκ α +  Notice that with the degree of 
openness (α ) and the coefficient of price indexation pγ  set to 
zero (that is, 0=α  and 0=pγ ), equation (45) reverts to the 
standard, purely forward-looking NKPC. The relation (45) also 
makes it clear that the standard formulation of NKPC based on the 
output gap assumes no price indexation to past inflation and hence, 
there is no inflation inertia in the model. 
The equilibrium dynamics for the small-open economy in terms of 
output gap and domestic inflation can be completed by writing a 
version of the IS equation in terms of  the  output gap. Indeed, by  
combining (39) and (43), it can be shown that 
 
},ˆ{)(ˆ1)()}ˆ{ˆ(1}{= 11,1 ∗+++ Θ+Ψ+−Γ+−−− tttatHttttt yEaErxEx αρρpiσ α
   
                                                                               
(46) 
 
where 1).(= −Θ ω  If the natural interest rate is defined as 
},ˆ{)(ˆ1)( 1∗+
−
Θ+Ψ+−Γ−≡ tttat yEarr αα ασρσρ  where 
the degree of openness and the expected world output affect the 
natural rate of interest, then the new IS equation has the following 
form: 
 
).}ˆ{ˆ(1}{= 1,1
−
++ −−− ttHttttt rrErxEx piσα
                    (47) 
 
Equation (47) relates the output gap in the forward-looking equation 
to the interest rate, domestic inflation and the natural interest rate. 
To solve this model, a loglinear approximation of the equilibrium 
conditions was made around a balanced-trade and zero-inflation 
steady-state.23 The dynamic properties of the model crucially 
depend on the monetary policy used. Indeed, with the Taylor rule, 
where the χ  parameter takes the value 1,  the  persistent  inflation 
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23The markup is also assumed to be constant at steady state (
)
1
=
−ξ
ξµ
 in order 
to derive the equilibrium conditions. 
  
 
response to a technology shock implies that this shock will have a 
permanent effect on price level, which will then have a unit root, 
mirrored by a unit root in the nominal exchange rate. In this case, 
following Galí and Monacelli (2005), targeting inflation rate and the 
monetary authority seeks to stabilize CPI inflation. Such a policy 
only requires that 
tyttpttt xEEr φpiφpi +− + )ˆ(=}ˆ{ˆ 1 , is set for all t. 
Moreover, following Woodford (1999) and Bullard and Mitra (2002), 
the study’s analysis focuses on the case where pφ  and yφ  have 
non-negative values. Thus, the necessary and sufficient condition 
for a stable allocation path24 is given by 
 
0.)(11)( ≠−+− yp φβφδ                                 (48) 
 
Furthermore, it is assumed that the foreign country pursues an 
optimal policy, implying a constant foreign-price level at 
equilibrium.25 The model's dynamics can be stable in this case, 
even with non-stationary prices; otherwise, with 1<0 χ , the 
price level is I(0) and the stable allocation-path condition (48) holds 
at equilibrium. 
In the following sections, the study will first set the model 
parameters as calibrated to the Canadian economy and before 
analyzing the welfare implications of each regime, the impulse 
response functions and second-moment statistics will be computed. 
 
 
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 
Model calibration 
 
Baseline calibration of the model is based on recent 
literature and closely follows Galí and Monacelli (2005). 
The parameter values used by this study are intended to 
reflect Canadian data. A labour supply elasticity of about 
1/3 was used which sets 3=φ  and a steady-state markup 
1.2=µ , meaning that the elasticity of substitution between 
different domestic goods ξ  is 6 . The average-price 
adjustment period by firms is set to four quarters and 
then the study sets the sticky-price parameter ψ  to 0.75, 
while the degree of openness of the economy α  is set to 
0.4 . The discount factor β  is assumed to be equal to 0.99  
and the elasticity of substitution between domestic and 
foreign goods θ  takes the value 1.5  according to Backus 
et al. (1995), and Galí and Monacelli (2005), who use the 
special case where 1.== σθ  
The remaining parameters are somewhat difficult to 
determine. Indeed, there is no consensus among open-
economy researchers about the values attributed to the 
intertemporal rate of substitution σ . Cochrane (1997) 
uses values between one and two, while Yun (1996) and 
Galí and Monacelli (2005) calibrated their models with 
model  similar   to   the   one   studied in this paper (using 
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24As shown by Bullard and Mitra (2003), this condition rules out Eigen values 
on the unit circle. 
25See Galí and Monacelli (2004) for a discussion of optimal policy in the 
foreign-country and SOE cases. 
 
 
 
 (using 1.=σ  The study follows Erceg et al. (2000) and 
sets this parameter to 1.5 . The price indexation 
parameter characterizes the backward-looking 
component in the NKPC. A 0.5 value for this parameter is 
frequently found in empirical estimates of the NKPC (see 
forSmets, 2003). Christiano et al. (2005) and Galí et al. 
(2001) use indexation to the past period's inflation rate 
but set the indexation parameter to one (full indexation). 
In contrast, estimates reported by Smets and Wouters 
(2003) and Sahuc (2004) using U.S. and Euro area data 
show that 
pγ  ranges from 0.40  to 0.64  with larger values 
for the U.S. case.26 The latter authors argue that partial 
indexation is data consistent and appears to capture 
inflation dynamics. Following Justiniano and Preston 
(2007), who estimated a small-open-economy Canadian 
data), this parameter is set at 0.55,=pγ  so that the 
backward-looking coefficient is 0.40 and the forward-
looking term is 0.71 in the price equation. The calibration 
for the policy-rule parameters follows Batini and Yates 
(2003) and Taylor (1993). The study sets ,pϕ yϕ 27 and 
piϕ
 
to 0.5. As discussed in Batini and Yates, the 
parameter χ calibration is quite difficult. Indeed, using a 
range of values within the interval [0,1], the authors show 
that the value of χ depends on the size of the inflation 
tax, the cost of indexation and the length of nominal 
contracts, but they do not however derive an optimal 
value for this coefficient. As discussed in section 2.3 and 
following Røisland (2006), the study sets χ
 
equal to the 
degree of price indexation to past inflation. Moreover, 
Galí and Monacelli (2005), using the Canadian labour 
productivity for the period 1963Q01 - 2002Q04 as a proxy 
for domestic productivity, estimate the stochastic 
properties of technology shock to be: 0.66=aρ  with a 
standard deviation of about one percent. Finally, these 
estimates are used and the residual correlation is set to 
zero, that is, 0.=),(
,
, tata
corr
∗
εε  Table 1 illustrates a 
summary of model-parameter calibration. 
 
 
Impulse response functions and second moment 
analysis 
 
Impulse response functions (IRFs) play an important role 
in describing the impact that shocks have on 
macroeconomic variables. To further understand this 
role, the IRFs of the main variables have been simulated 
using three rules : IT, PT and HT. The results are 
reported in Figures 1 to 3, displaying  impulse  responses  
                                            
26Leith and Malley (2003) estimate an open-economy NKPC for the G7 
countries, using a model with backward-looking behaviour. They find that this 
parameter ranges from 0.54 in some countries up to as high as 0.87 in others. 
27
 In the original Taylor rule, the weights on the output gap and inflation are set 
to the standard weight of 0.5, which is common in the literature. 
  
Table 1. Model calibration. 
 
Parameters µ ϕ  ξ θ σ α ψ χ  
pϕ  piϕ  yϕ  ρA σA ρA∗ σy∗ 
Values assigned 1.2 3 6 1.5 1.5 0.4 0.75 0.55 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.66 1% 0.76 1% 
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Figure 1. Impulse response functions to domestic productivity innovations. 
 
 
  
 
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
3 6 9 12 15
-2.0
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
3 6 9 12 15
-2.0
-1.6
-1.2
-0.8
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
3 6 9 12 15
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
3 6 9 12 15
-3.0
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
3 6 9 12 15
-0.4
0.0
0.4
0.8
1.2
1.6
2.0
3 6 9 12 15
-2.5
-2.0
-1.5
-1.0
-0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
3 6 9 12 15
-1
0
1
2
3
4
3 6 9 12 15
-1.0
-0.8
-0.6
-0.4
-0.2
0.0
0.2
0.4
3 6 9 12 15
HT IT PT
Output Gap Domestic Inflation CPI Inflation
CPI Price Level Domestic Price Level Terms of Trade
Nominal Exchange Rate Net Export Nominal Interest Rate
Output gap Domestic inflation 
CH i flation 
CP rice l vel 
Domestic Price level Terms of trade 
National exchange 
rate 
Net profit National 
interest rate 
 
 
Figure 2. Impulse responses to a foreign productivity shock under HT, IT and PT regimes. 
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Figure 3. Impulse responses to interest rate rule innovations under HT, IT and PT regimes. 
 
 
 
up to 15 quarters. Figure 1 displays the impulse 
responses to a one percent positive technology shock 
under HT, IT and PT regimes. The output gap response 
function has the same patterns for all three regimes,  with 
a hump-shaped pattern and initial negative responses 
ranging from -1.4 (IT) to -0.3% (PT). The peaks are 
reached after three to five quarters and then the IRFs 
revert slowly to steady-state.  Inflation  responses  (domestic  
  
 
 
and CPI-based inflation) display different patterns 
depending on  the  policy  that  is been  targeted. While 
domestic inflation has approximately the same response 
as the output gap under HT and IT, the IRF under PT is 
quite different -0.3 Indeed, showing a small variation, 
domestic inflation under PT has an initial value of  
reaches a 0.2% peak in about 1.5 periods and then 
rapidly reverts to the steady-state. The response of CPI 
inflation under PT is flat at the steady-state level. The 
study can intuit that this is because the price targeting 
rule imposes a path for the price level at its steady-state 
value, which prevents both CPI and domestic inflation 
from displaying more variability when the model is hit by 
a transitory technology shock. 
The main difference occurs with regard to the initial 
response to the shock, which is zero for CPI inflation 
under the HT regime and negative under IT with hump-
shaped responses. Therefore, the monetary authority has 
the same response under all three rules, stabilizing 
inflation when the technology shock occurs. The same 
patterns are displayed by the domestic and CPI price-
level responses with a hump-shaped domestic price 
response under HT and IT. The unit root in the price level 
is then mirrored by the unit root in the exchange rate. 
However, the responses of those three variables are 
quite different during HT and IT targeting, where after a 
while the path reverts to initial values. The initial fall in the 
domestic and CPI price responses under HT and IT are 
followed by hump-shaped patterns (more pronounced for 
IT targeting) with a slow increase toward steady-state 
values. Furthermore, the impact on foreign aggregates is 
negligible by construction, implying that the world interest 
rate remains unchanged. There is an anticipated do-
mestic currency appreciation induced by the uncovered 
parity (UIP). Thus, the exchange rate depreciation 
explains the paths followed by the inflation rates that rise 
in the shock period and then revert back to initial levels. 
The nominal interest rate shows a different response. 
With an initial response to the shock that is negative, it 
increases in a hump-shaped pattern to attain a peak in 
about five periods and then returns to steady-state values 
under all regimes. This can be intuited to mean that after 
the economy has been hit by a technology shock, the 
optimal monetary authority response will increase the 
nominal interest rate by a larger amount than the 
increase in inflation, resulting in an initial increase in the 
real interest rate level. 
The terms of trade and net exports display similar 
paths, where initial positive responses and decreases 
reach steady-state values persistently. This leads to a 
stationary behaviour for those variables, which is defined 
as a property  of  the  model. The  nominal exchange rate 
moves in the wrong direction, especially under HT and 
PT.28  The  dynamic  effects of foreign technology shocks  
                                            
28One can believe that monetary contraction generates appreciation for the 
domestic currency. Thus, capital outflows cause demand for foreign exchange 
to increase and not to fall, as is the case here, especially under PT. 
 
 
 
are displayed in Figure 2. In this case, the foreign 
monetary authority reacts to shocks by lowering the world 
interest rate to stabilize inflation. The domestic authorities 
react in the same way by reducing their own interest rate 
to counteract the real appreciation caused by the foreign 
policy,29 followed by a gradual depreciation until both 
interest rates converge to their steady-state levels. 
Moreover,   the   output   gap   and   domestic   inflation 
responses display hump-shaped patterns under all 
targeting rules. CPI inflation responses are different given 
the rule followed by the monetary authority. While the 
terms-of-trade variable is more stable under HT and PT 
targeting, responses persistently remain above initial 
levels for this variable under IT targeting. The same 
patterns are  displayed  for  net  exports  under  the  three 
regimes. The decline in domestic and CPI prices is more 
accentuated with this shock under IT. The nominal 
interest rate response takes the hump-shaped form and 
then reverts to the initial value. The main difference 
between home and foreign technology shock responses 
is registered for the exchange rate, while the response 
under  all  regimes  persistently  remains  above the initial 
levels. 
Finally, the response functions of the macro variables 
to unit innovations in the policy shocks reveal that all 
variables  display approximately the same patterns under 
HT and PT targeting. However, the initial domestic and 
CPI price responses under IT targeting are persistently 
above the steady-state levels for more than 10 periods 
and  then  revert  to  the   steady-state.  Interestingly,  the 
figure shows persistent exchange rate responses slightly 
below the initial values for all regimes. This can be 
explained by the negligible effect of the policy innovations 
on foreign variables. Indeed, a rise in the nominal interest 
rate is followed by an instant currency appreciation and 
an anticipated depreciation since the world interest rate 
remains unchanged. Asset and goods generate such 
movements in exchange rate and price levels. In order to 
conclude the quantitative analysis, the second moments 
for some macro variables under the three regimes are 
shown in Table 2. For each variable, standard deviation 
in percentage points was reported. The second moment 
analysis confirms the IRF visual analyses. Indeed, the IT 
regime requires more volatility in CPI and domestic price 
levels than that shown under the other regimes. Terms of 
trade are more stable under IT, where their volatility is 
about two times lower than that for the PTs. It can be 
intuitively predicted that under IT, the price level should 
follow the I(1) process. Hence, price adjustment after the 
occurrence of shocks is carried out very sluggishly, 
leading to sluggish inflation behaviour. In fact, lagged 
price levels have little direct influence on current price 
levels. In this case, the price adjustment made after 
shock   occurrences   inevitably   entails   sharp    inflation 
                                            
29With our earlier assumption about the foreign monetary policy that stabilizes 
price levels at equilibrium, a reduction in the world interest rate implies an 
appreciation of home currency. 
  
 
Table 2. Volatility under alternative policy regimes (standard deviation in %). 
 
 Variable HT regime IT regime PT regime 
 Output gap 0.115531 0.292549 0.221236 
 Domestic inflation 0.208678 0.425783 0.248183 
 CPI inflation 0.151996 0.231277 0.9386e {¹⁵} 
 Nominal interest rate 0.174683 0.115639 0.071611 
 Exchange rate 4.028806 1.472007 4.576895 
 CPI Price level 0.247563 2.272017 0.000000 
 Domestic price level 0.599330 2.369227 0.693747 
 Terms of trade 1.110025 0.898438 1.734369 
 
 
 
fluctuation. Furthermore, the hybrid target can be set 
taking into account both inflation and its corresponding 
price level, such that past price levels affect current price 
levels, but their influence is not as strong when under IT. 
In this case, the price level path will lie between those 
under IT and PT. As pointed out by Kobayashi (2004), it 
can be said that implementing hybrid targeting can lead 
to relatively moderate inflation volatility by appropriately 
incorporating both the sluggish nature of inflation adjust-
ment under IT and the rapid nature of inflation response 
under PT. More generally, it is found that across regimes, 
higher inflation and greater output gap volatilities result in 
higher welfare scores. These findings are in line with the 
results obtained by Galí and Monacelli (2005). 
 
 
Welfare analysis of alternative regimes 
 
The analysis of welfare implications for different monetary 
policy rules has become an important field of study 
(Taylor, 1999). The main concern is how important it is 
for policy makers to have access to a set of tools that 
allow them to predict the effects of switching from one 
policy rule to another. It would thus be worthwhile to 
investigate the welfare implications of the hybrid regime 
and compare them to other monetary-policy targeting 
schemes considered in this work. The application of the 
quadratic approximation of the objective function is 
complex and cannot be simply derived in an open-
economy model with sticky prices. A popular measure 
thus uses inflation and output gap volatility, in addition to 
the utility function. 
Furthermore, a welfare-maximizing central bank may 
target CPI inflation and price or a combination of specific 
price and inflation paths. In fact, the key difference in 
approaches to inflation/price-level targeting concerns a 
stable and long-run price level compared to maintaining a 
particular rate of inflation. These rule-based approaches 
have different welfare implications. Aoki (2001) and 
Devereux and Engel (2000) show that in a closed 
economy with sticky prices and backward-looking 
behaviour, optimal policy entails  the  perfect  stabilization 
of the inflation rate. In fact, Svensson (1999) shows that if 
the monetary authority has a price-level targeting 
objective, then this may reduce inflation variability without 
affecting output variability. This 'free-lunch' result depends 
on substantial endogenous output persistence in the 
New-Classical Philips curve. Dittmar and Gavin (2000) 
extend this analysis to the case where expectations are 
forward-looking in a New-Keynesian Philips curve. They 
show that the free-lunch argument was applied without 
the need for persistence terms. Thus, the assigning of a 
price-level targeting objective by the central bank 
appears to improve welfare if expectations are forward-
looking or if there is substantial endogenous persistence. 
Likewise, Vestin (2000) argues that in a purely forward-
looking model, price-level targeting will provide more 
efficient outcomes than inflation targeting. Concerning a 
closed-economy model, Nessen and Vestin (2000) suggest 
that hybrid targeting will provide better outcomes than 
targeting inflation, only if the Philips curve has forward-
and backward-looking components. 
The  evaluation  of household welfare in the small-open 
economy can be expressed as a fraction of steady-state 
consumption. Here, the study follows Galí and Monacelli 
(2005), who derive a second-order approximation to the 
domestic consumer utility function in a SOE model.30 This 
second order approximation,31 expressed as a fraction of 
steady-state consumption, reveals that the expected 
welfare losses of any policy in terms of domestic inflation 
and output gap variances are then given by; 
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30See Appendix 4 in Gal and Monacelli (2004) for details on the welfare-loss 
function derivations. However, the derivation is restricted to the special case of 
log utility and unit elasticity of substitution between different goods (i.e. 
1)=== θησ  in deriving an exact expression; otherwise, its derivation 
is more complex. We use this approximation for the purpose of comparing 
different regimes without loss of generality. For more discussion about welfare 
analysis in the loglinearized model, refer to Kim and Kim (2003) and Schmitt-
Grohe and Uribe (2004). 
31After dropping terms independent of policy and those of high order and 
computing the unconditional expectation of this approximation. 
  
 
Table 3. Welfare losses under alternative policy regimes. 
 
 Variable HT regime IT regime PT regime 
Benchmark µ=1.2, φ=3, α=0.4 and χ=0.55 
 Var (Domestic inflation) 0.043546 0.181292 0.061595 
 Var (Output gap) 0.013347 0.085585 0.048945 
 Welfare loss (Ξ) -0.929222 -3.904543  -1.350430 
 
µ=1.2, φ=3, α=0.4 and χ=0.25 
 Var(Domestic inflation) 0.067517 0.222545 0.057849 
 Var(Output gap) 0.001193 0.004340 0.001566 
 Welfare loss (Ξ) -1.417321 -4.672170 -1.215020 
 
µ=1.2, φ=3, α=0.4 and χ=0.85 
 Var (Domestic inflation) 0.001255 0.035528 0.019625 
 Var (Output gap) 0.048605 1.295282 1.238130 
 Welfare loss (Ξ) -0.084637 -2.299402 -1.897320 
 
Low degree of openness µ=1.2, φ=3, α=0.25 and χ=0.55 
 Var (Domestic inflation) 0.026702 0.141287 0.025688 
 Var (Output gap) 0.005782 0.047865 0.019376 
 Welfare loss (Ξ) -0.708635 -3.775443 -0.702432 
 
Low steady-state mark-up and Low elasticity of labor supply 
µ=1.1, φ=10, α=0.4 and χ=0.55 
 Var (Domestic inflation) 0.177927 1.400579 0.118844 
 Var (Output gap) 0.009838 0.070990 0.011315 
 Welfare loss (Ξ) -3.763743 -29.60564 -2.529602 
 
 
 
Using this expression,32 different  monetary  policies 
can be compared to assess their welfare implications and 
highlight welfare costs among regimes. Table 3 shows 
welfare losses associated with three different regimes: 
HT, IT and PT. It is assumed that the central bank wants 
to minimize variations in domestic inflation (
tH ,pi
). Indeed, 
since most of the countries that use inflation targeting are 
likely to target CPI inflation rather than home inflation 
(namely producer-price inflation), HT has been essen-
tially compared to the CPI inflation targeting regime (IT in 
the text). Entries for loss functions are percentage units of 
steady-state consumption. There are five panels in this 
table. In the first panel, welfare losses were reported 
under the study’s benchmark calibration. The remaining 
panels display the effects of using different policy 
parameter values ( χ ) and lowering respectively, the degree 
of economy openness (α ), the steady-state mark-up ( µ ) 
and    the     elasticity   of   labour  supply  (φ )   (Galí  and 
                                            
32Recently, Rø island (2006) has shown that under the HT regime the central-
bank loss function should be modified to take the form 
22
1)ˆˆ(= ttt xppL λχ +− − , where χ  is as in the text and λ  is a 
modified weight on the output gap. This assumption cannot be used here since 
we aim to compare various targeting regime. We relay this case to future work. 
Monacelli, 2005). 
The results show that under the study’s benchmark 
parameterization, the reduction in welfare loss results 
from a decrease in output and domestic inflation volatility 
varying  from  an  IT  to an HT regime. On the other hand, 
the CPI inflation targeting leads to a much higher level of 
losses in the welfare-loss function than those obtained by 
the two other regimes. In fact, as usually found in the 
literature,33 welfare losses are quantitatively small for all 
regimes. As compared to the benchmark case and using 
different policy parameters, the HT regime implies 
substantially larger welfare losses as one gets closer to 
extreme values corresponding to either IT (with 0.85=χ ) or 
PT (with 0.25=χ ). As one gets closer to the extremes, the 
PT targeting performs well, lowering both inflation and 
output gap variabilities. This finding is in line with recent 
studies of monetary policy showing PT targeting 
outperforming IT targeting (for example Svenson 1998; 
Vestin, 2000; Røisland, 2006). the effect of lowering the 
degree of economy openness is considered next. This 
has a general effect on decreasing both domestic inflation 
and output gap volatilities, leading to  low  welfare  losses  
                                            
33Kollman (2002) and Smets and Wouters (2003) are recent examples of papers 
in which monetary-policy welfare implications are investigated. 
  
 
under all regimes. This can be intuited to the fact that the 
decrease in volatilities and the resulting welfare values 
are essentially generated by movements in small-open-
economy variables such as terms of trade and exchange 
rate which have low effects in a 'quasi-open economy' 
(with small α ). In this case, HT and PT deliver lower 
welfare losses than the IT regime. 
Finally, the study explored the effects of lowering both 
the mark-up to 1.1, which leads to a larger penalization 
of inflation variability in the loss function and the elasticity 
of labour supply to 0.1, which implies a larger 
penalization of output gap volatility. This leads to a similar 
output gap volatility compared to the other scenarios 
considered here, and in turn to an amplification of the 
volatility of domestic inflation, which implies higher 
welfare losses for all three regimes. Interestingly, the IT 
leads to a significantly larger loss compared to the two 
other regimes and gives a loss function value up to 10 
times higher than the HT and PT. In comparison with PT, 
an HT regime leads to a larger welfare loss, meaning that 
the results may be sensitive to the model assumption, as 
pointed out by Galí and Monacelli (2005) and Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2001).34 
 
 
CONCLUDING REMARKS 
 
This paper investigates hybrid inflation/price-level 
targeting from a New-Keynesian perspective. To this end, 
generalizations of the models proposed by Galí and 
Monacelli (2005) and Monacelli (2003) are calibrated to 
the Canadian economy. Both papers develop a small-
open-economy model incorporating many of the 
microfoundations appearing in a closed economy within 
the New-Keynesian framework  (Clarida  et al., 2000; 
Woodford, 2003) recently used for the analysis of 
monetary policy. The model's open-economy version 
allows for the possibility that international trade in goods 
and financial assets affects the evolution of the domestic 
economy, thus giving rise to richer dynamics within the 
model, given the study’s assumption of complete security 
markets. Furthermore, in light of the considerable 
attention paid in recent macroeconomic literature to 
monetary-policy formulations in terms of interest rate 
rules, the study adopts this formulation to construct three 
regimes. In addition, for the purpose of comparison of the 
hybrid regime, the IT and PT regimes were analyzed. The 
study’s results show that hybrid targeting can lead to a 
successful monetary policy strategy, yet, without any 
major loss in the welfare function. 
In overall, an HT regime seems to be an appropriate 
method of conducting monetary policy if the monetary 
authorities want to achieve price stability. In fact, the 
long-run anchor for a central bank is clearly price stability.  
                                            
34The authors argue that the welfare ranking among different monetary policies 
may be sensitive to distortions in the economy. 
 
 
 
 
The problem is whether then it should target price level or 
variations in this price level (inflation rate). Recent 
literature on PT shows that anchoring the price level to a 
long-run price-level path is a good idea, given agents' 
expectations (forward and/or backward looking). 
However, since conservative central bankers seem to 
need more time to reach this point, it is believed that an 
intermediate way should be hybrid targeting and that 
more research is needed before PT can be implemented 
or even considered for implementation, as it is the case, 
for example, in Canada. Likewise, in this kind of model, 
including more nominal rigidities, particularly sticky 
wages or some type of wage indexation would be 
expected to change the results obtained in a significant 
manner. Further research is therefore necessary in order 
to establish the manner in which these frictions would 
likely alter this finding. 
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